Auction design where the money is
Auction design, first- and second-price auctions and bidding behaviour appear on 114 recent papers, mostly in economics, and the topic is fading, with 16 papers in the last quarter against about 32 per quarter before. Procurement auctions, which buy public goods and services worth trillions, appear on 2 papers. Which formats get governments the best price, and do bidders collude in the rest?
What prompted this
Since October 2025, 114 papers carry an auction keyword (81 in economics journals, 12 in finance, 10 in operations research): "auction design" on 15, "first-price auctions" on 12, "second-price auctions" on 9, "auctions" on 7, "auction revenue" on 6. Thirty-five of the 114 also carry a procurement, combinatorial, reverse-auction, supplier, bidding, public or government keyword, but "procurement auctions" appears on 2 and "reverse auctions" and "combinatorial auctions" on 4 each. Sixteen auction papers were published in July–September 2026 against about 32 per quarter earlier.
Questions
- In public procurement data, do scoring auctions that weigh quality beat lowest-price auctions on final cost after change orders and delays?
- Can bid patterns in procurement data detect collusion, and do the detected cartels match prosecuted ones?
- Do combinatorial formats, used for spectrum and transport contracts, deliver the efficiency gains claimed, net of their complexity?
Data that could help
Procurement portal data with bids, awards and contract outcomes, spectrum auction records, and cartel prosecution records.
Next step
Compare final costs and delays of road contracts awarded by lowest price and by scoring rules in one country's procurement data.