Populism and the trade shocks behind it
Populism appears on 26 recent papers, mostly in the economics journals, with 7 in the last quarter against about 5 per quarter before. Only 2 of them carry a trade, globalization, tariff or automation keyword, although the "China shock" is the best-known economic explanation of populist votes. Do the newer shocks (inflation, immigration, AI) now matter more?
What prompted this
Since October 2025, 26 papers carry a populism keyword (15 in economics journals, 6 in management): "populism" on 15, "right-wing populism" on 6, "populist parties" on 4. Only 2 of the 26 also carry a trade, globalization, import, China-shock, tariff, protection, inequality or automation keyword. "Trade policy" and "globalization" appear on 46 and 41 papers each, but not in the same papers as populism.
Questions
- In the elections of 2024–2026, did regions hit hardest by import competition still vote more populist, or did inflation and immigration exposure take over as predictors?
- Do populist governments deliver the trade protection they promise, and does protection then reduce their support?
- Does exposure to AI-related job losses already predict voting, as import competition did?
Data that could help
Regional election results, trade exposure measures by region, local inflation and immigration data, and AI exposure by occupation.
Next step
Regress regional vote shares in recent European and US elections on import competition, local inflation and AI exposure, and compare the coefficients with those from the 2010s.