Does macroprudential tightening push credit into shadow banks?
Macroprudential policy and financial intermediation are both rising in the finance journals, but papers that follow credit out of the regulated banking system are rare, and none of them is in an economics journal. When regulators tighten on banks, how much lending simply moves to shadow banks and private credit funds?
What prompted this#
In the finance dashboard trends, "macroprudential policy" had 23 papers in July–September 2026 against about 14 expected from its earlier share, and "financial intermediation" had 13 against about 3. Since October 2025, 129 papers carry a macroprudential keyword (90 in finance journals, 35 in economics). Only 7 of them also carry a shadow-banking, private-credit or non-bank keyword, all in finance journals. "Private credit" itself appears on just 4 papers.
Questions#
- After loan-to-value limits, countercyclical capital buffers or loan caps tighten, does credit to the same borrowers rise at non-banks?
- Is the credit that leaks out riskier, more expensive or shorter-term than the bank credit it replaces?
- Does the leakage undo the policy's effect on house prices and leverage, or only part of it?
Data that could help#
- A macroprudential policy database (for example the IMF's iMaPP) for the timing of measures.
- Syndicated loans (DealScan), private credit deals (Preqin, PitchBook) and bank lending from supervisory filings.
Next step#
Find borrowers in DealScan that borrow from both banks and non-banks, and compare the two kinds of borrowing around national macroprudential tightenings.